Editorial | Whose power? Cabinet or NSC?

Section 69 (1) of Jamaica’s Constitution establishes a Cabinet and gives the prime minister the power to name its members.

The following subsection gives the Cabinet responsibility for “ the general direction and control of the Government of Jamaica and shall be collectively responsible therefor to Parliament”.

In other words, the prime minister chairs the Cabinet but does not replace it. There is no constitutional basis on which the Cabinet can delegate its powers to another body or authority.

These facts are noteworthy in the face of two significant policy declarations last week that raise important questions about constitutional authority and governance, given the source from which these directives arose.

The Cabinet Office announced not only that the National Security Council (NSC) recommended that the minimum sentence for the illegal possession of a firearm be increased from 15 to 20 years, but that the Ministry of National Security and Peace has been “ directed to have the draft legislation with the proposed amendments ready by the end of November this year for wider consultations”.

Further, Tax Administration Jamaica (TAJ) has been directed to cease issuing demonstration plates that allow unregistered vehicles to operate temporarily and to consider a new system that would allow such vehicles, which are usually in the control of vehicle importers and garages, to be electronically monitored.

legitimate national concerns

Both initiatives address legitimate national concerns. Gun violence remains a grave threat to Jamaica’s development while the abuse of demonstration plates creates opportunities for criminal activity and tax evasion.

The issue, however, is not simply whether the proposed measures are desirable. It is whether the institutional arrangements through which they are being pursued respect Jamaica’s constitutional system of government. Good policy objectives do not automatically confer lawful authority on the institutions pursuing them.

The National Security Council is not a recent creation. According to the Office of the Cabinet, it was established in 1976 as a subcommittee of Cabinet with responsibility for overseeing national security. Its contemporary significance increased substantially after 2016 when the Holness administration strengthened the national security architecture, including the establishment of the Office of National Security Advisor.

In June 2017, during the parliamentary debate on the Zones of Special Operations legislation, Prime Minister Dr Andrew Holness announced that the Government intended to anchor the NSC in law and proposed including a representative of the Opposition in its deliberations. The suggestion recognised that an institution exercising considerable influence over national policy required a clear legal foundation and appropriate accountability arrangements.

Nearly a decade later, that legislation has been brought to Parliament, and it is not known if it remains on the administration’s agenda. The Government should explain its position on the matter.

While the NSC can exercise functions lawfully delegated to it, it cannot appropriate constitutional authority similar and superior to that of the Cabinet simply because the prime minister chairs the body.

Indeed, the Government’s own practice once made this distinction explicit. In February 2017, NSC recommendations concerning crime were referred to a special Cabinet meeting for consideration and approval.

That was the appropriate institutional relationship.

Regarding the proposal for increasing the minimum sentence for firearm matters, Parliament has the authority to determine criminal offences and penalties, subject to constitutional limitations. The judiciary is responsible for applying the law to individual cases.

The NSC may legitimately recommend changes to criminal legislation. However, sentencing policy requires more than an assessment of the national security threat. It calls for consideration of proportionality, constitutional rights, judicial discretion, rehabilitation, correctional capacity, and the empirical evidence concerning deterrence. Happily, in this matter, Parliament will at least have a say in the decision-making as the legislature will have to specifically amend the Firearms Act if the NSC’s proposal is to become law.

The NSC’s purported directive to TAJ, however, raises an even more immediate institutional concern. Acting on the proposal would primarily be an administrative function. Moreover, TAJ operates within a statutory framework that assigns responsibilities to the responsible minister, its board, its commissioner general, and, in specified circumstances, the financial secretary. The NSC does not automatically possess authority to issue binding instructions to statutory agencies merely because their activities have national-security implications.

In any event, the Government had already outlined substantial proposals for dealing with the problem identified for the NCS, including a digital-permit system, recall of existing plates, and legislative amendments. These were announced at an April 2025 post-Cabinet press briefing.

potential institutional danger

Modern national security extends well beyond military defence and policing. It encompasses cybersecurity, border protection, organised crime, financial stability, critical infrastructure, energy security, and economic resilience. This broader understanding has considerable merit, but it creates a potential institutional danger.

If virtually every major public policy issue can be defined as a national-security concern, the NSC could gradually become an alternative centre of government, exercising functions traditionally undertaken by Cabinet, ministers, and statutory agencies. Such a development would amount to the presidentialisation of Jamaica’s parliamentary system without corresponding constitutional reform or national consent. It would also risk weakening the institutional capabilities Jamaica desperately needs to develop.

Effective government requires strong coordination. But strong coordination should strengthen ministries, regulatory agencies, and public institutions rather than substitute for their lawful authority. A state does not become more capable simply because more decisions are concentrated at its centre.